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more government programs, a cleaner environment) than
could be met.
When Ronald Reagan won in a near landslide-50.7
percent of the popular vote against Carter's 41 percent
inflation was the dominating concern. Voters didn't know
that Reagan could control it; but they did know that Carter
couldn't. Later, Carter himself judged that inflation had
been the decisive issue against him, more important than
his mishandling of the Iranian hostage crisis. Exit polls
showed that 47 percent of Reagan's voters rated "control
ling inflation" as the most important issue, followed closely
by 45 percent who valued "strengthening America's position
in the world." In the Gallup Poll in September, 58 percent
rated inflation as the No.1 problem.

How Inflation Was Subdued
The subjugation of inflation was principally the accom
plishment of two men: Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan.
If either had been absent, the story would have unfolded
differently and, from our present perspective, less favor
ably. Reagan, president from 1981 to 1989, and Volcker,

The Fed's IInse
How the Federal Reserve engineered
the most dramatic peacetime
experiment in monetary and fiscal
stimulus in U.S. history without
anyone noticing
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UP UNTIL SEPTEMBER, Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben Bernanke effectively steril
ized all his financial crisis-fueled mon
etary injections, either by directly trading
Treasury bills for riskier financial securi
ties or by indirectly loaning to financial
institutions with money recouped by
selling Fed-held Treasuries on the open
market. Either way, there was no major
impact on the monetary base. As a result,
the annual rate of growth of the monetary
base remained in the neighborhood of 2
percent through August, with total bank
reserves remaining virtually constant.
But after September 17, when the
interest on T-bills briefly went negative,
Bernanke opened the monetary flood-

chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from
1979 to 1987, forged an accidental alliance that
was largely unspoken, impersonal, and mis
understood. There was no particular personal
chemistry between the men. Nor was there any
explicit bargain-you do this, and I'll do that.
Although Reagan supported Volcker, many offi
cials in his administration openly criticized him.
Even while the alliance flourished, it sometimes
seemed a mirage.
But the alliance was genuine, a compact of
conviction. Both men believed that high infla
tion was shredding the fabric of the economy
and of American society. The country could not
thrive if it persisted. Buttressed by these beliefs,
they broke with the past. Each had a role to play,
and each played it somewhat independently of
the other.
Volcker took a sledgehammer to inflation
ary expectations. He raised interest rates, tight
ened credit, and triggered the most punishing

gates. In August the monetary base had
been $847 billion, with total reserves
constituting $72 billion of that. (None
of these figures are seasonally adjusted
or adjusted for changes in reserve
requirements.) A Fed press release on
October 22 put the base at $1.149 tril
lion, a shocking 40 percent jump over the
previous year. What has exploded even
more is total bank reserves, where the
base increase is concentrated. Reserves
increased by an astonishing factor of five
over the course of just one month, and as
of late October were somewhere between
$343 and $358 billion.
And that's not all. Federal Reserve
Bank credit also doubled to around $1.8
trillion. Although Fed credit once closely
mirrored the monetary base, that is true
no longer-not since the Fed activated
its U.S. Treasury supplementary financ
ing account in the fall. This boosted
additional Treasury deposits from zero
to approximately $560 billion. The new
deposits resulted from what the Trea
sury calls its Supplementary Financing

Program, initiated in September to try to
staunch the growing demand for Treasury
securities manifested in fallingT-bill
rates.
Essentially, the Treasury is now issu
ing extra securities to borrow money from
the economy, then loaning the money to
the Fed in these special deposits so that
Bernanke can re-inject it to make his bail
out purchases of various securities, all
without increasing the monetary base. ln
other words, what the infamous bailout
act permitted the Treasury to do directly
is something it had already started doing
indirectly through the Fed to the tune of
half a trillion. All in the name of easing a
tight Treasury market.
This means that the total bailout
is not the $700 billion that Congress
appropriated, but at least $1.2 trillion.
And that figure doesn't include the Fed's
mid-October promise of $540 billion to
bail out money market funds, which if not
covered by the Fed's sale of other assets,
will require either further monetary
increases or further Treasury borrow-
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economic slump since the 1930s. In December
1980, banks' "prime rate" (the loan rate for the
worthiest business borrowers) hit a record 21.5
percent. Mortgage and bond rates rose in concert.
By the summer of 1981, consumers had trouble
borrowing for homes and cars. Many companies
couldn't borrow for new investment. Industrial
production dropped 12 percent from mid-1981
until late 1982. In many industries, declines were
steeper. In autos, it was 34 percent (from June
1981 to January 1982), and in steel it was 56 per
cent (from August 1981 to December 1982). By
1982 the numberofbusiness failures had tripled
from 1979. Construction starts of new homes
in 1982 were 40 percent below the 1979 level.
Worse, unemployment exploded. By late 1982, it
was 10.8 percent, which remains a post-World
War II record.
It is doubtful that, aside from Reagan, any
other potential president would have let the Fed
proceed unchallenged. Certainly Carter wouldn't

in g. Thus we now have the worst of both
worlds: a massive bailout financed both
by Treasury borrowing (in order to avoid
inflation) and a Federal Reserve increase
of the monetary base (which heralds
future inflation anyway).
Of the $1.2 trillion increase in federal
government borrowing, at least half took
place within the space of a month. This
sudden 25 percent increase in the out
standing national debt qualifies as the
most dramatic peacetime experiment in
fiscal stimulus the U.S. government has
ever implemented. If Keynesian theory
were correct, the economy should have
been well beyond the reach of any poten
tial recession by the end of October.
But how many economists are going
to acknowledge this striking empirical
refutation of the fiscal policy they hold
dear?
This enormous increase in govern
ment debt may at least partly explain
the sudden stock market collapse after
the bailout passed. Government borrow
ing represents a future tax liability, and

have, had he been re-elected, nor would his chief Demo
cratic rival, Sen. Edward M.Kennedy (D-Mass.). Both would
have faced intense pressures from the party's faithful, led
by unionized workers-especially auto- and steelworkers
who were big victims ofVolcker's austerity. Nor is it likely
that any of the major Republican presidential contenders
in 1980 would have acquiesced, including George H.W.
Bush, Howard Baker, and John Connally. Reagan's initial
economic program promised to reduce the money supply
to curb inflation. He was the first president to make that
part of his agenda, and he never retreated from it. As the
economy deteriorated, he kept quiet. He refused to criticize
Volcker publicly, to urge a lowering of interest rates, or to
work behind the scenes to bring that about.
When the president did speak, he supported Volcker.
At a press conference on February 18, 1982-with unem
ployment near 9 percent-Reagan called inflation "our No.
1 enemy" and referred to fears that "the Federal Reserve
Board will revert to the inflationary monetary policies of
the past.'' The president pledged that this wouldn't happen.
"I have met with Chairman Volcker several times during

expected future taxes affect the value
of equities. Some argue that this new
borrowing may not increase taxes at all
because it merely finances the purchase
of earning assets that the government
can later resell. While that's certainly
possible in the long run, no one knows
the true value of those assets in the short
run. After all, the market's anxiety about
their worth was the justification for the
bailout in the first place. So now the gov
ernment is transferring that uncertainty
from private financial institutions to the
taxpayers.
Meanwhile, there will be a lag before
the broader measures of the money sup
ply feel the effects of the Fed's money
bomb. The year-to-year annual growth
rate of M1-currency in circulation plus
checking accounts-had already risen
from o percent to over 7 percent as of late
October, whereas that of M2 (Ml money
plus other types of deposits and most
money market funds) is up slightly from
6 to 7 percent. But as centuries of experi
ence has shown, an increasing money

supply will inexorably lead to increasing
inflation.
Bernanke is betting that he can
reverse the process before inflation gets
out of hand. But that will require the Fed
dumping billions worth of securities it
has recently purchased back on the mar
ket. It is anybody's guess when Bernanke
will judge that the financial system is
sound enough for him to do so. All the
emergency initiatives of both the Fed and
the Treasury since the subprime problem
first emerged have not merely proved
stellar and consistent failures. As Anna
Schwartz, Milton Friedman's esteemed
co-author, and other economists have
suggested, the thrashing about of Fed
and Treasury policy has undoubtedly
made the financial situation worse. The
prospects do not look promising. li
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel is an economics profes
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A History of the American Civil War (open
Court).
II'.J',(lri i J<~nudty 700<)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I 53

